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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of sub-national institutions on the performance of foreign 
firms in China. Building on institutional theory, we envisage that the negative effect of sub-
national institutional constraints is moderated by firm size and age, entry mode, and market 
orientation. Our hypotheses are tested on a large-firm-level dataset of about 29,000 foreign 
firms in 120 cities in China within the period of 1999-2005. We find that firm size and age 
both have a diminishing positive impact on foreign firm performance; moreover, there is a U-
shaped relationship between firm age and foreign firm performance in cities with higher level 
institutional constraints. We also find that joint ventures help mitigate the negative impact of 
sub-national institutional constraints on foreign firm performance when the level of 
institutional constraints is higher. 
Key words: sub-national institutions, institutional theory, foreign firm, firm performance, 
China. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Great attention has been devoted to the influence of institutional characteristics of host 
countries on the behaviours of multinational enterprises (MNE) and their subsidiaries. Within 
this stream of research, many studies focus on how the host countries‟ institutional 
environment affects the strategic choices of multinational subsidiaries regarding aspects such 
as location choice, entry mode choice, organization structure, choice of technology, capital 
and labor staffing, and sequence of investment (e.g., Brouthers and Brouthers, 2008; Chan, 
Isobe and Makino, 2008; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Luo, 
2001; Meyer, 2001; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and 
Eden, 2005). However, less scholarship has linked institutional characteristics to subsidiary-
level performance (Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008). Some existing studies examine the roles 
of entry strategies in the survival of new foreign firms (Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 
2003; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Miller and Eden, 2006). Others studies focus on the relationship 
between the institutional environment of host countries and the performance of established 
foreign subsidiaries (Chan et al., 2008; Garu and Lu, 2007; Henisz, 2000; Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999). However, very few of them investigate the types, behaviours, strategies, or 
characteristics of foreign firms that best facilitate performance with the institutional variations.  
Moreover, little attention has been paid to the institutional variations within a host 
country; instead, most of the existing studies adopt a cross-country approach, with a focus on 
subsidiaries of MNEs from a specific home country, mostly the U.S. or Japan, operating in 
foreign countries. By identifying cross-country difference and assuming homogeneity within 
a country, this line of research can inform the practice of MNEs from specific home countries. 
The element that is largely neglected, however, is the impact of institutions on the 
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performance of foreign firms operating in a specific host country. Just as institutions are not 
homogeneous across countries, homogeneity cannot be assumed within a country employing 
the same political and economic system; instead, there is significant subnational spatial 
heterogeneity (Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 2013). In recognition of the importance of 
variations within a country, Meyer and Nguyen (2005) examine the impact of sub-national 
institutions on the entry mode choice of foreign firms in Vietnam. In a more recent study, 
Chan, Makino, and Isobe (2010) examine the extent to which sub-national regions can explain 
foreign affiliate performance in the U.S. and China, and they find that the sub-national region 
is significant in explaining foreign affiliate performance. Their results also suggest that sub-
national differences are more critical to the explanation of firm performance in emerging 
economies than they are to that of developed economies. However, much remains to be 
known about how sub-national institutions impact the performance of foreign firms.  
This paper intends to offer, to the best of our knowledge, the first study investigating 
the impact of the level of sub-national institutional development on the performance of 
foreign firms in the largest emerging economy, namely, China. We define the level of sub-
national institutional development as the extent to which the political and economic 
institutions in a sub-national region are developed and are favourable to foreign firms. This 
study pays a particular attention to the interaction effects of sub-national institutions and firm 
size, firm age, ownership type, and market focus on foreign firm performance. We choose 
China as the empirical setting of this study for several reasons. First, China‟s economy has 
been growing rapidly over the last two decades; China is now the largest recipient of foreign 
investment in the world (UNCTAD, 2010). Second, China features a one-party political 
monopoly; democracy and transparency are not integral to the Chinese political and economic 
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system. Over the last three decades, China has gone through a major economic transition 
process; however, weaknesses in formal and informal institutions remain major obstacles to 
successful business. Third, the lack of sound institutions, together with imbalance of 
economic policy and development between different regions, enforces the diversified 
institutional environment across regions in China, which permits the exploration of 
implications of institutional variation within a country. These institutional constraints found in 
different locations suggest important performance implications for foreign firms. 
Theoretically, we adopt an integrative perspective of institutional theory and resource-based 
view, following Meyer et al. (2008), Meyer and Peng (2005), Peng (2003), Wright, 
Filatotchev, Hoskisson and Peng, (2005), and Yamakawa, Peng, and Dees (2008).  
Our hypotheses are tested on a large sample of foreign firms (numbering 29,065) 
located in 120 cities in China during the period of 1999-2005. In total, we have collected 
128,461 firm-year observations. Our results indicate that there is a negative relationship 
between sub-national institutional constraints and foreign firm performance. We also find that, 
as hypothesized, joint ownership with local partner(s) dampens the negative relationship and 
that firm size and age have a U-shaped relationship with performance. Our hypothesis on the 
relationship between market-orientation and performance is not supported. 
This study contributes to the literature in multiple ways. It enriches institutional theory 
by providing evidence of the relationship between institutional constraints and firm 
performance and the moderating effects of firm behaviours and characteristics on this 
relationship. It fills an important niche in the literature of international business studies by 
systematically examining the adaptation of foreign firms to diverse sub-national institutional 
environment in a large emerging economy. It provides evidence of the effectiveness of 
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previous studies regarding the impact of institutional environment on entry mode choice and 
location choice of foreign firms. 
 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Sub-national institutions and foreign firm performance 
Institutions are widely defined by “the rules of game,” or more formally, “the humanly 
devised constraints that structure human interaction” (North, 1990). Specifically, institutions 
are multidimensional constructs encompassing many types of country-specific political, 
economic, and social characteristics. Such characteristics originate from the economic and 
political systems regarding the extent to which a country is governed by rule of law, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the country‟s court system, outright or de facto expropriation, 
enforcement of contracts between the focal firm and its local partners, violation of intellectual 
property rights, and so forth (Henisz, 2000; Uhlenbruck, Meyer and Hitt, 2003).  
Recent theoretical work has integrated an institutional perspective with the analysis of 
business strategies (e.g., Dacin, Goldstein & Scott, 2002; Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2003) and 
international business (e.g., Mudambi and Navarra, 2002; Ramamurti, 2003; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008) by incorporating theoretical advances in institutional economics and sociology 
into strategy and international business research. Empirically, existing studies have found that 
institutions significantly shape the strategy and performance of firms (Chan et al., 2008; 
Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Delios, 2001;  Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Wright et al., 2005). 
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Formal institutions (such as the legal framework) and informal institutions (such as the 
practices of law enforcement) shape the transaction costs in pertinent markets and, 
consequently, investors‟ strategic choices and firms‟ performance (Meyer, 2001). Moreover, 
institutions influence the evolution of resources and capabilities (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). 
For instance, networking competences are mostly developed in countries where transactions 
are usually based on relationships and networks (Kock and Guillen, 2001; Meyer & Nguyen, 
2005; Peng and Heath, 1996). The institutional environment thus shapes the key parameters 
determining foreign firms‟ strategic choices and performance.  
Coinciding with the rise of emerging economies in the global economy, scholars are 
increasingly turning their attention to these countries (Henisz et al., 2008; Peng and 
Pleggenkuhle-Miles, 2009). The salience of institutions is more evident for MNEs operating 
in emerging economies, where institutions differ significantly from those in developed 
economies and are experiencing rapid changes. In fact, there has been increasing 
acknowledgement that the institutional context of emerging economies influences foreign 
investors‟ strategic choices (Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2008). However, most of the existing 
studies limit themselves to the variations between national institutions. 
Institutions not only vary between countries, but also within countries (Chan, Makino 
& Isobe, 2010; Du et al., 2008; Luo, 2001;  Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; Wright et al., 2005; 
Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 2013).  The variations of the sub-national institutional 
environment within a country can be very vast, especially in an emerging economy. A typical 
emerging economy has gone through major economic transition, while weaknesses in the 
institutions remain major obstacles to business (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). More importantly, 
liberalization has been implemented unevenly in this type of environment (Meyer & Nguyen, 
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2005), which leads to huge differences in economic and institutional development within the 
country. For instance, tax rates attract the FDI inflow in special economic zones in Chinese 
cities (Head and Ries, 1996). Meanwhile, decentralization of power from the central 
government to local governments has seen a shift from national control to regional regulation 
(Luo, 2007). As a result, sub-national level governments have secured increasing power by 
manoeuvring economic policies in their regions (Luo, 2007). The uneven economic 
development and liberalization, increasing power at regional level and differences in 
implementing policies at sub-national level lead to huge variations in economic and political 
institutions at sub-national level in an emerging economy. These within country variations in 
economic and political institutions not only affects the volume and entry modes of FDI 
inflows (e.g., Du et al., 2008; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005), but also the costs of doing business in 
different regions (Chan et al., 2010; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005) and thus the profitability of 
engaging in business activities in these regions.  
The development of sub-national economic institutions varies within a host country 
(Chan et al., 2010, Chung & Alcacer, 2002). As discussed above, in a typical emerging 
economy, economic liberalization has been implemented unevenly, which leads to huge 
variations in FDI policies within the country (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). The governments in 
some countries may alter their FDI policies by allowing certain sub-national regions to open 
to foreign investors first, and/or by offering different forms of preferential treatment to 
foreign firms that locate in different regions (Ma & Delios, 2007; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). 
Others may allow certain sub-national regions to set up certain laws and tax rates for foreign 
firms. For instance, in China, many FDI policies such as tax rates, tariff reductions, land 
usage and local financing vary significantly by region. Although these policies are set at 
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national level, their implementation often takes place at sub-national level (Meyer & Nguyen, 
2005) and varies across sub-national regions.  Regions with unfavourable policies for foreign 
firms may create challenges for foreign firms, whereas those with favourable policies may 
facilitate the development of foreign firms‟ competitive capabilities and thus promote their 
financial performance.  
Sub-national regions in an emerging economy also vary in the development of the 
market economy. As discussed above, the implementation of economic liberalization in a 
typical emerging economy has been uneven.  For instance, the coastal regions and special 
economic zones of China are more developed than other regions in economic freedom, human 
capital and technologies (He, 2003; Head and Ries, 1996). Foreign firms located in regions 
with well-established economic institutions are able to benefit from access to the human 
capital and technologies and skills that the regions can offer. In regions with more developed 
economic institutions, there is also less intervention in firm behaviour, for example, staff 
redundancies, from the government (World Bank, 2006). Thus foreign firms located in these 
regions can operate more efficiently and competitively (North, 1990). 
At national level, political institutions include governments and the constraints that 
they impose on such key actors as politicians and political parties (Chan et al., 2008). At sub-
national level, a key element of political institutions is local bureaucratic practices. The 
efficiency and transparency of local government is important to the development of sub-
national political institutions. Sub-national regions not only differ in the way of interpreting 
and implementing policies but also in government efficiency (World Bank, 2006). For 
example, World Bank (2006) reports that the time that foreign firms spend dealing with 
government authorities significantly varies across the cities in China. Foreign firms not only 
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have to follow the local regulations, but also conform to the local bureaucratic practices. For 
foreign firms, such bureaucratic constraints at local level may increase transaction costs and 
coordination costs and thus affect their performance.  
Political institutions also set and enforce the rule of law (Chan et al., 2008; Rodriguez 
et al., 2005). In an emerging economy, the transparency of laws and their enforcement vary 
across sub-national regions (Du et al., 2008). In sub-national regions with inadequate 
transparency and enforcement of law, contractual agreements are not effectively enforced or 
protected and thus the risks and costs of doing business increase. The lack of transparency of 
laws or their inadequate enforcement also leads to poor protection of intellectual property 
rights (Ostergard, 2000; Oxley, 1999). Weak protection of property rights discourages firms 
from pursuing innovation and thus from operating competitively (North, 1990). Property 
rights protection therefore has a positive impact on enterprise performance (Lu, Png & Tao, 
2013). 
In sum, economic and political institutions vary across regions within the host country. 
Such differences in sub-national institutions create opportunities and challenges for foreign 
firms and thus affect their performance. Foreign firms that operate in sub-national regions 
with a low level of institutional development are likely to engage in costly market transactions 
and less efficient transformation, whereas foreign firms that operate in sub-national regions 
with a higher level of institutional development can capitalize on the advantages generated by 
the presence of better-developed institutions. Just as institutions at the national level affect the 
performance of foreign firms (e.g., Chan et al., 2008), sub-national institutions can affect the 
performance of foreign firms at the regional level. A sub-national region with better-
developed institutions provides more favourable institutional context for foreign firms, which 
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in turn has a positive impact on the competitiveness and profitability of foreign firms
1
. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: The level of sub-national institutional development has a positive relationship 
with foreign firm performance. 
 
Sub-national institutions, size, age and foreign firm performance 
Firms‟ size and age have been extensively investigated in the literature of industrial 
organizations (IO) and business studies as the most important factors that relate to firm 
performance (e.g., Blau, 1970; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Dobrev and Carroll, 2003; Hall 
and Weiss, 1967; Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). The general finding is that firm size is 
positively related to firm performance, as size is often related to the possession of market 
power, capability, market credibility and scale economies (Haveman, 1993; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). The most prevalent argument on size effect is that economic scale lowers 
costs and promotes performance (Dobrev & Carroll, 2003; Hall and Weiss, 1967; Haveman, 
1993; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Likewise, age has long been documented as being positively 
related to firm performance, as age is often seen as indicative of experiences-based 
capabilities, ability to adapt to changes and new environments, and market credibility (Baum, 
1989; Baum & Shipilov, 2006; Henderson, 1999; Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). However, 
existing studies mostly focus on firms in the context of developed economies, and very few of 
them focus on the firms in emerging economies. Furthermore, there has been little evidence 
                                                          
1
 Note that in reality there is not a random matching of foreign firms to regions; instead, foreign firms may 
choose to invest in regions with stronger institutions although specific incentives may change this pattern. This 
needs to be addressed in the empirical method, which will be discussed in the methodology section. We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for this input. 
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showing how firm size and age influence firm performance in particular institutional 
environments.  
In an emerging economy, size may still have a positive impact on foreign firm 
performance for the reasons discussed above as it does in a developed economy. Moreover, 
larger foreign firms are more likely to receive preferential treatment (Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 
2010). In an emerging economy, a primary goal of the local governments is employment and 
revenue growth (Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). Governments are therefore motivated to 
attract as much FDI as possible because the volume of FDI inflow is used as an indication of 
the performance of local governments. Therefore, larger-size foreign firms will gain support 
from local government, which in turn has positive impact on foreign firm performance.  
The size effects, however, may not be monotonic. Existing studies have suggested that 
size has a diminishing rate of effect on firm performance (Evans, 1987; Haveman, 1993; 
Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). Likewise, we predict that, in an emerging economy like 
China, the benefits bestowed on size will diminish with increasing size as there is a natural 
bound to the amount of the benefits that size can offer. Once firms reach a critical size, the 
level of benefits cannot be commensurate with the level of size. Therefore, we predict a 
curvilinear relationship between firm size and foreign firm performance; specifically, as size 
increases, foreign firm performance will increase at diminishing rate.  
As discussed above, the sub-national institutions vary across regions in an emerging 
economy. The importance of size may have an impact on foreign firm performance in a 
different manner across regions due to different sub-national institutional environments. In 
particular, in less-developed sub-national institutional environments, size becomes more 
valuable for several reasons. First, larger foreign firms have greater influence and bargaining 
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power with the local governments because of their impact on local employment and economy 
(Park and Luo, 2001; Perkins, 1994; Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). Second, larger foreign 
firms are more likely to receive preferential treatment (Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). Local 
governments are motivated to attract as much FDI as possible, because the volume of FDI 
inflow is used as an indication of the performance of local governments. These characteristics 
may provide larger firms with greater ability to overcome institutional and other 
disadvantages, gain institutional support and advantages, and thus achieve better performance 
(Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). By contrast, small firms are less likely to gain such 
institutional benefits, given their small employment impact (Park & Luo, 2001; Shinkle and 
Kriauciunas, 2010), and are less able to bargain with the local governments or to overcome 
the institutional disadvantages due to their small size. Thus, in regions with less-developed 
institutional environments, we expect to observe a sharper increase in foreign firm 
performance as firm size increases. Accordingly, we should see a more pronounced 
curvilinear relationship between firm size and foreign firm performance.   
In summary, in an emerging economy, firm size has a positive impact on foreign firm 
performance, but the effect is diminishing. In the meantime, in less-developed sub-national 
institutional environments, size becomes more important and thus sub-national institutions 
modify the relationship between firm size and foreign firm performance. Therefore, we 
establish the following hypotheses: 
H2a: In an emerging economy, firm size has a curvilinear relationship with foreign firm 
performance, but the effect is diminishing. Specifically, as firm size increases, the firm’s 
performance increases at a diminishing rate. 
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H2b: In less-developed sub-national institutional environments, the curvilinear relationship is 
more pronounced (relative to regions with more developed sub-national institutional 
environments).  
 
As discussed earlier, existing studies suggest that age has a positive relationship with 
firm performance (Baum & Shipilov, 2006; Henderson, 1999), as older firms typically 
possess better knowledge and experiences, which are developed over time. This is particularly 
critical for foreign subsidiaries operating in an emerging economy as newly establish foreign 
firms are subject to the liability of newness. It takes time for foreign firms to acquire local 
knowledge and to develop the capabilities to undertake business changes and adapt to local 
environments. Thus, the length of operations may enhance foreign firms‟ performance. In an 
emerging economy, institutional relationship with local governments is also critically 
important for foreign firms‟ performance as firms with stronger institutional relationships are 
more likely to receive institutional support. Age is also an indication of the level of 
institutional relationships (Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). These institutional relationships 
are particularly important in the setting of China, given the importance of “guanxi” when 
conducting business in China (Park & Luo, 2001).  
Similar to the effect of size, the existing literature has documented that age has a 
diminishing rate of positive effect on firm performance. For example, Shinkle and 
Kriauciunas (2010) reveal a positive diminishing relationship between firm age and export 
growth in Central and Eastern European firms. We anticipate that this movement applies to 
the relationship between age and foreign firm performance in an emerging economy setting, 
because once the foreign firms acquire the necessary local knowledge and establish 
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institutional relationships, further effects of age can be limited; that is, the positive effects of 
age cannot increase commensurately.  
 On the other hand, newly established foreign firms in the host country can receive 
preferential treatments from regional governments. In the setting of China, local governments 
compete with each other to attract FDI. As a result, they often offer various preferential 
policies for newly established foreign firms. Therefore, although new foreign firms typically 
lack local knowledge, experiences, and strong institutional relationships, they can benefit 
from preferential treatments offered by local governments.  
In summary, the less-developed institutional environment provides advantages to older 
foreign firms, as they can acquire local knowledge, experience, and institutional relationships 
over time. In the meantime, newly established foreign firms can receive preferential 
treatments. As a result, we expect older and newer firms to perform better in the less-
developed institutional environments. These arguments suggest a U-shaped relationship. The 
above discussion leads to the hypotheses as follows: 
H3: Firm age has a positive impact on foreign firm performance, but the effect is diminishing. 
H3a: In environments with higher-level institutional constraints, there is a U-shaped 
relationship between firm age and foreign firm performance. 
 
Moderating effect of entry mode  
There has been an extensive literature on how institutional variables influence the 
choice of entry modes for foreign firms (e.g., Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Neugen, 2005; Meyer 
et al., 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005). These institutions include formal institutions, such as the 
legal framework, and informal institutions, such as the practices of law enforcement and 
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corruption. Institutions have an essential role in the selection of an appropriate model of entry 
for several reasons. First, institutions shape the transaction costs and then influence the entry 
mode choice (Brouthers et al., 2003; Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Neugen, 2005). Second, 
institutions have impact on the evolution of firms‟ resources and capabilities, such as 
networking competences (Kock and Guillen, 2001; Peng and Heath, 1996). Third, institutions 
establish the range of entry modes permitted in a given institutional context and the equity 
stake allowed to be held by foreign firms (Meyer and Neugen, 2005; Meyer et al., 2009).  
In particular, joint ventures are often seen as the favoured entry mode in a weaker 
institutional framework (Meyer et al., 2009), as joint ventures provide a means to access 
resources such as networking resources that may help to counteract the negative effects of a 
weaker institutional context (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Meyer et al., 2009). Moreover, the 
regulatory framework in an emerging economy often restricts foreign investment in some 
sectors and creates constraints on entry mode choice (Meyer and Neugen, 2005) and thus joint 
ventures are the only choice for foreign investors in particular sectors at the early stage of 
liberalization in a typical emerging economy.  
However, there is less evidence related to how entry mode choice helps alleviate the 
negative impact of institutional constraints on foreign firm performance. On one hand, joint 
ventures are often instable due to the cultural differences and conflicts between domestic and 
foreign partners (Ren, Gray and Kim, 2010; Yan and Zheng, 1999). Moreover, foreign partners 
are often unwilling to transfer state-of-art technologies to joint ventures. Wholly foreign 
owned enterprises (WFOEs) can avoid these potential problems and achieve high performance. 
on the other hand, joint ventures are expected to perform better than WFOEs, as they can 
benefit from both the domestic and foreign partners and thus enjoy more advantages (Xu et al., 
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2006); Specifically, the domestic partners can brings in local knowledge as well as important 
institutional relationships with local governments, while the foreign partners often bring in 
advanced technologies, managerial and marketing skills, and better corporate governance. The 
benefits of joint ventures are particularly evident in less-developed institutional environments. 
We expect that WFOEs generate better performance than joint ventures in general. However, 
we anticipate that, in regions with higher levels of institutional constraints, joint ventures 
perform better than WFOEs.  
H4: On average, joint ventures perform worse than wholly foreign-owned firms. 
H4a: In the environment of higher-level institutional constraints, joint ventures mitigate the 
negative impact of sub-national institutional constraints on foreign firm performance. 
 
Moderating effect of market orientation 
As is well known, market orientation (local vs. export market) is of particular 
importance to the understanding of the competitive advantage of a firm (Day et al., 1992; 
Hunt and Lambe, 2000). The market orientation of foreign firms could be the result of 
strategic decision of the headquarters, which constitutes part of the global strategy of the 
MNEs, or the decision at the subsidiary level. Either way, market orientation is an important 
instrument for adjusting foreign firms‟ vulnerability to contextual hazards (Bartlett & Ghoshal. 
1989). By definition, local market-oriented foreign firms are inevitably more involved with 
the local business community and hence expose themselves to local institutional 
environments (Luo, 2001). This implies that exporting-oriented foreign firms are less likely to 
be affected by local institutional constraints and will achieve high performance. Moreover, 
exporting firms are generally equipped with more advanced technologies and capabilities and 
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hence perform better than local-market-oriented firms. Therefore, we expect that, in general, 
exporting-oriented foreign firms perform better than local-market-oriented foreign firms. 
On the other hand, sub-national institutional constraints may restrict the performance 
of exporting-oriented foreign firms. In less-developed institutional environments, 
governments may have a high level of involvement in export transactions through regulatory 
permissions, regulation relief and tax advantages (Makhija, 2003). Higher levels of 
institutional constraints may restrict firms‟ access to cross-border trading (Filatotchev, 
Dyomina, Wright and Buck, 2001). Bureaucracy may also increase the costs of exchange with 
foreign customers. Therefore, we predict that, although export-oriented foreign firms 
generally perform better than local-market-oriented firms, in the regions with higher levels of 
institutional constraints, exporting magnifies the negative relationship between sub-national 
intuitional constraints and foreign firm performance: 
H5: On average, exporting-oriented foreign firms perform better than local-market-oriented 
foreign firms. 
H5a: In regions with higher-level institutional constraints, the negative impact of sub-
national institutional constraints is more severe on exporting-oriented foreign firms.   
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
We tested our hypotheses using China as the research setting, which we see as a 
particularly interesting empirical context.  Our data on foreign firms in China was drawn from 
two primary sources. The first source is the Annual Census of Industrial Enterprises (hereafter 
referred to as the Census data) 1999-2005. The Census data, compiled by the National Bureau 
This is the accepted version of Li, Xiaoying and Sun, Laixiang (2016) How do sub-national institutional constraints impact 
foreign firm performance? International Business Review 26 (3), 555-565. Version of record available from Elsevier: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.11.004 
Accepted version made available from SOAS Research Online under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International at: 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24203/  
19 
 
of Statistics (NBS) of China, covers all firms, including both domestic and foreign firms, with 
annual turnover of more than 5 million Chinese Yuan (about US $60,000). The number of 
firms included in this database ranged from 162,033 to 280,188. It is estimated that the firms 
in the dataset account for 85-90 percent of total output of manufacturing industries in China. 
These numbers are consistent with those reported in the official Yearbooks published by the 
NBS. We collected the information on firm ownership structure, industry affiliation, 
geographic location, establishment year, employment, gross output, and other operational and 
financial variables from this dataset.  
We then linked the Census data to the second primary data source of this study – the 
Survey of Foreign-invested industrial enterprises in China 2001-2002 (hereafter referred to as 
the Survey). The survey was conducted by China‟s former Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation. The survey currently serves the most comprehensive database about 
FDI in China and contains more than 150,000 foreign firms from more than 50 source 
countries. We identified the information about the country of origin of foreign firms from the 
Survey data.  
The above two sources allowed us to compile a dataset consisting of more than 40,000 
foreign firms in China over the period 1999-2005. This study aims to examine the impact of 
sub-national institutional constraints on foreign firm performance. Our data on sub-national 
characteristics was collected from World Bank (2006) survey on government effectiveness 
and investment environment in China.
2
  The survey covered 120 cities only instead of all of 
the cities in China.  For this reason, we restrict our sample to the firms in 120 cities. Our data 
suggests that foreign firms in these 120 cities account for more than 90 percent of FDI in 
China. We excluded firms that have changed ownership since its establishment and firms 
                                                          
2
 More details of the survey can be found in World Bank (2006). 
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from countries and industries with limited observations in our sample. We also eliminated 
observations with illogical or extreme values. Finally, we included firms with at least two 
consecutive years in the sample and obtained an unbalanced panel of 29,065 foreign firms 
over the period 1999-2005 with 128,461 firm-year observations in total.  
 
Measurement 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is performance of foreign firms. Firm performance is primary 
research question within the field of IB and as a result, performance is a key dependent 
variable of interest to IB scholars. In the literature, three types of performance measure have 
been used, i.e., financial, operational, and overall effectiveness. In this study, we use financial 
measure return on sales (ROS) as primary measurement of performance and then use an 
operational measure, labour productivity, as an alternative measurement to check robustness. 
ROS, rather than return on assets (ROA), is used as ROS is regarded as a superior measure in 
the global environment (Chan et al., 2008). In fact, because foreign firms focus on ongoing 
businesses, sales can better reflect their performance across changes in the business climate 
than fixed assets (Chan et al., 2008).  
Hypothesized variables 
To measure the institutional constraints of a city, we constructed a sub-national index 
using measurement items of city characteristics drawn from the World Bank survey of 120 
cities in China. The survey investigated the government effectiveness and investment climate 
in the cities. We employed six items that captured the government effectiveness, legal 
environment, and economic environment of a city, including days spent on bureaucratic 
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interactions, confidence in  court, property right protection, tax and fees, proportion of private 
sector, and labour flexibility. We then conducted principal components analysis with a 
varimax rotation for all six items. This analysis yielded one distinct factor and the items 
loaded significantly on one factor with factor loadings 0.70-0.84 except that the factor loading 
of days spent on bureaucratic interaction is 0.60.
3
  
Moreover, since the measures of the  variables were collected using the same survey 
instrument, the possibility of common method bias (CMB) was tested using Harman‟s one 
factor test as advised by Podsakoff and Organ (1986). An unrotated principal components 
factor analysis yielded four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. As several factors 
instead of one single factor were identified and all of them accounted for just 62% of the total 
variance, and as the first factor accounted for only 21% of the variance, a substantial amount 
of common method variance does not seem to be present (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).  
To test hypothesis 2-5, we include variables firm size, firm age, joint venture dummy, 
and exporting dummy. In line with the literature on impact of size and age on firm 
performance (e.g., Porter, 1985), we included both linear and quadratic terms of size and age 
to control for diminishing effects of these two variables. 
Control variables 
We expect that other factors will affect the performance of foreign firms. For this 
reason, we include the following variables as controls. First, we include a set of variables on 
firm characteristics, including dummies for Hongkong, Maucau and Taiwan firms, sales 
growth, leverage ratio and market concentration. Second, we include a set of variables to 
control for other factors of the cities, including infrastructure, material cost, and labour cost. 
                                                          
3
 Normally we expect the factor loadings are above 0.65. However, we kept this item in order to capture the 
aspect of government efficiency despite that its factor loading is slightly low. Moreover, our analysis using an 
index constructed from the other five items yielded qualitatively the same results as we reported in this paper. 
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We use road mileage as an indicator of infrastructure adequacy to see the impact of 
infrastructure on firm performance, use electricity price as an indicator of input price, and use 
average wage in each city to control for the cross-city variation in labour cost. Third, we 
coded three sets of dummy variables capturing the effects of country of origins, industries, 
and years. The definition of the variables is presented in Table 1.  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1- 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation and correlations for all variables. Of 
interests is that firm performance and sub-national institutional index both have very large 
standard deviations, suggesting that there is huge difference in foreign firm performance and 
in institutional environments of the cities. Further, the correlations between the variables are 
reasonably low, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. Also, variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is 7.91, which confirms that multicollinearity is not there. 
 
Estimation method 
Fixed-effects method is not appropriate for this study because our city-level variables 
are all time invariant and the fixed-effects method would drop these variables of interests 
from the regression. The random-effects method is not appropriate for our study either 
because sub-national institutional constraints may be correlated with the unobserved 
individual effects. This could result from two facts. First, high-performing firms may choose 
to locate in cities with better institutional environments. Second, there may be a co-evolution 
of foreign firms and institutional environments (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Cantwell, Dunning 
and Lundan, 2010). This potential endogeneity problem violates the basic assumption of 
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random-effects method. A popular method to take into account of the endogeneity issue is 
system GMM, which is particularly useful when a panel has large N and small T, as in this 
study. However, since sub-national institutional constraints index is time-invariant and is 
highly likely to be correlated with the unobserved individual effects, system GMM is not 
appropriate for this study (Roodman, 2009).  
Therefore, we adopt the frequently used approach in the literature, the Hausman-
Taylor (1981), in this study. This method allows for the time-invariant regressors to be 
correlated with the unobserved individual effects. The Hausman-Taylor method makes use of 
time-varying explanatory variables to serve as instruments for endogenous time-invariant 
variables. This method represents a two-fold improvement over the fixed-effects and random-
effects methods: it is more efficient and produces estimates for the coefficients of time-
invariant variables (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). In this study, sub-national institutional 
constraints index is endogenized
4
. We also endogenize the time-invariant variable of joint 
venture dummy as it has been documented in the literature that ownership structure of foreign 
firms may be correlated with the latent individual effects. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Empirical results 
                                                          
4
 The estimation of Hausman-Taylor method is based on the method of instrumental variables. First, we estimate 
the equation on time-varying variables to obtain within estimates and within residual. Then, we regress the 
residual on sub-national institutional index to obtain the intermediate estimate, using time-varying variables as 
instruments. The within estimates and intermediate estimate are used to obtain within and overall residuals, 
which are used to estimate variance components. The variance components are then used to do GLS 
transformation on each of the variables. Last, we regress the GLS transformed ROS on GLS transformed 
independent variables, using estimated time-varying variables as instruments.     
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Table 3 presents the empirical results of our hypothesis testing. Model 1 contains the 
hypothesized and control variables. Within Model 2 to Model 5, we add the interaction terms 
of sub-national institutional constraints and hypothesized variables. We observe that the 
control variables of labour quality, sales growth, leverage ratio, electricity price, and average 
wage exhibit the expected signs and are significant, while the coefficients of HMT dummy, 
road mileage, and coastal dummy are not significant. The results are robust throughout the 
five models. 
The first obvious finding in Model 1 is that sub-national institutional constraints have 
a negative impact on foreign firm performance, as expected from H1. We also notice that size, 
size-squared, age, age-squared, joint venture dummy, and exporting dummy all have expected 
signs and are significant. We next consider the interaction terms. In Model 2, we find that the 
coefficient of the interaction term between size-squared and institutional index is insignificant, 
which indicates that our hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between firm size and foreign 
firm performance in less-developed sub-national institutional environment is not supported. In 
Model 3, we find that the interaction terms are significant and have expected signs. These 
results support our hypotheses that firm age not only has a diminishing positive relationship 
with foreign firm performance but also has a U-shaped relationship with foreign firm 
performance in regions with less-developed institutions. The results of Model 4 suggest that 
our hypothesis related to the moderating effect of joint ventures is supported too, while the 
results of Model 5 indicate that the hypothesis related to market orientation is not supported.  
We tested the robustness of the results using various sub-samples. Examining three 
randomly selected subsamples (90%, 80%, and 70% of the total observations, respectively), 
firms established after 1990 and firms with more than 40 employees, and we found that the 
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results were consistent with those estimated by using the full sample. We use labour 
productivity, total factor productivity (TFP) and return on equity (ROE) as alternative 
measures of firm performance, and we obtained qualitatively similar results, as we report here.  
 
Discussions and implications 
This study aims to examine how sub-national institutions have an impact on foreign 
firm performance. We pay a special attention to the moderating effects of firm size and age, 
entry mode, and market orientation on this relationship. In H2, we predicted a U-shaped 
relationship between firm size and foreign firm performance. We find that, although firm size 
has a positive diminishing impact on foreign firm performance, the U-shaped relationship 
does not exist. The results confirm our assertion that large foreign firms can receive 
favourable treatments from local institutions due to their contribution to local economy and 
employment. The favourable treatments, however, cannot increase infinitely and will reach a 
limit at a certain point. On one hand, this result suggests that small-sized foreign firms in 
China do not appear to exploit the institutional voids to the point of demonstrating positive 
effects on firm performance. On the other hand, existing studies suggest that, in a less 
developed environment, small firms may perform better than medium-sized firms. In 
particular, Shinkle and Kriauciunas (2010) find a U-shaped relationship between firm size and 
export growth in Central and Eastern European countries. They argue that, although small 
firms are not able to achieve the institutional advantages that large firms do, their smallness 
provides them with other advantages not available to larger firms; in particular, they argue 
that institutional voids in less-developed institutional environments allow small firms to use 
institutional entrepreneurship (Chiaburu, 2006; Khanna & Palepu, 2000) more readily than 
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medium-sized firms. The less-developed institutional frameworks of transition economies 
provided opportunities as well as institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). These 
entrepreneurs may benefit from the opportunities and institutional voids created by the 
institutional environment (Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). Moreover, small firms are less 
likely to gain attention from the government and hence avoid institutional constraints but may 
take advantage of institutional voids. This is particularly true for foreign firms in China, as 
small-size foreign firms are more likely to be joint ventures with local partners, thus enabling 
them to be more flexible in overcoming the liability of foreignness while taking advantage of 
institutional advantages. 
We now discuss the hypotheses related to firm age. We find support for the 
hypothesized positive diminishing relationship between firm age and foreign firm 
performance as well as a U-shaped relationship between firm age and foreign firm 
performance in less-developed institutional environments. These results conform to our 
prediction that older foreign firms are able to gain necessary knowledge, experiences, and 
institutional relationships over time, which in turn creates a positive impact on firm 
performance. The positive effects, however, cannot increase boundlessly and will reach a 
limit at a certain point. In the meantime, newly-invested foreign firms can take advantage of 
preferential treatment offered by local governments.  
The results support our hypothesis that, on average, WFOEs perform better than joint 
ventures, while in less-developed institutional sub-national environments, joint ventures have 
the advantage. This result suggests that, although WFOEs can enjoy advanced technologies 
and managerial know-how, their abilities are restricted in regions with a higher level of 
institutional constraints. As predicted, exporting-oriented foreign firms perform better than 
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local-market-orientation firms. On the other hand, our results do not support the hypothesis on 
the moderating effect of market orientation. This suggests that the effects of sub-national 
institutional constraints on the performance of exporting-oriented firms are limited. This 
finding, however, is consistent with the exporting-oriented FDI in China over the last decade. 
The growth of the Chinese economy over the last decade has to a great extent depended on the 
growth of exporting and, in particular, the exporting of foreign firms, as many foreign firms 
have invested in China in order to take various advantages that China has offered. The growth 
of exporting has led to the development of local institutional support for exporting and the 
reduction of restrictions related to exports. Therefore, the effects of local institutional 
environment on exporting-oriented firms are limited.   
Our results have significant implications for foreign firms operating in or entering into 
emerging economies. Foreign investors must decide where and how to set up their operations 
and the scale of the investment. These strategic decisions have to accommodate institutional 
conditions that vary not only between countries, but also within the host economy (Wright et 
al. 2005). Investors adapt strategies for formal and informal institutions prevailing at the host 
location, especially when entering emerging markets. Our results indicate that newly-invested 
foreign firms can benefit from preferential treatments and hence perform better. For instance, 
local governments in China often offer preferential treatment for newly-invested foreign firms 
in order to attract FDI to special development zones/districts of their own cities. The 
institutional peculiarities among different locations within a country also affect the preferred 
entry mode. We find that, although WFOEs generally perform better in an emerging economy, 
joint ventures would be still attractive when entering into sub-national regions with less-
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developed institutional environments.  In contrast, exporting-oriented foreign firms may not 
have to be concerned with the constraints imposed by sub-national institutions.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the interesting results and rich implications, a number of limitations of this 
research need to be addressed. First, our measure of institutional constraints is time invariant 
due to the data limitation. Since emerging economies experience rapid institutional change, 
future research may improve by considering a time-variant measurement of sub-national 
institutions. Second, our research uses a constructed institutional index to measure the overall 
institutional constraints in Chinese cities. Future research might proceed to examine the 
impact of different aspects of institutional constraints on foreign firm performance. Third, we 
note that our analysis may be subject to survivor bias; that is, firms included in our analysis 
may be winners of survival tests over the years. In our study, we collect information about 
firms within the period of 1999-2005 only. We were not able to obtain information about 
firms that failed or exited business outside this time frame. Also, our data includes firms 
above a certain criteria only. Disappearances from our sample may result from changes of 
output rather than businesses that exited or failed. Therefore, we are not able to control the 
effects of survivor bias in this study. This is, however, a common limitation among works of 
research related to firm performance (Xu, Pan, Wu, and Yim, 2006). Fourth, our empirical 
setting is limited to one emerging economy − namely, China. The results might be country-
specific. Future research using cross-regional data in other emerging economies would allow 
for generalization of the results.  
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Table 1: Definition of the variables 
 
 Measurement Data source 
ROS Return on sales The census data 
Sub-national institutional index Constructed based on survey data of the World Bank Constructed from World Bank (2006) 
the authors Firm size The number of employee/1000 The censu data 
Firm age the number of year since established/10 The census data 
Joint venture 1 if the firm is a joint venture, 0 otherwise The census data 
Exporting dummy 1 if exporting-oriented firms, 0 otherwise The census data 
HMT firms 1 if a firm is from Hongkong, Macau or Taiwan, 0 otherwise The census data 
Sales growth Sales growth of the firm The census data 
Leverage ratio The ratio of debt and equity The census data 
Market concentration Standard Herfindahl index of market concentration The census data 
Coastal dummy 1 if a firms is located in a coastal city, 0 otherwise. The census data 
Average wage Average annual wage of workers in the city/1000 World Bank (2006)  
Road mileage Total road mileage in the city World Bank (2006)  
Electricity price Electricity price of a city World Bank (2006)  
home country dummy Dummy variable to control for country of origin The Survey data 
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Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
 
Variables mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 12 13 14 
1. ROS 0.02 0.12 1.00            
2. City index 0.00 1.00 0.17 1.00           
3. Size/1000 0.31 0.54 0.03 0.08 1.00          
4. Age/10 0.76 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.11 1.00         
5. Joint venture 0.52 0.50 0.01 -0.21 -0.09 0.10 1.00        
6. Export dummy 0.67 0.47 0.02 0.22 0.17 0.05 -0.21 1.00       
7. Labor quality 2.56 0.68 0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.00 -0.02 1.00      
8. HMT firms 0.56 0.50 -0.06 0.18 0.00 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.18 1.00     
11. Coastal dummy 0.71 0.45 0.01 0.21 0.06 0.05 -0.15 0.19 0.19 0.00 1.00    
12. Average wage 21.00 6.05 -0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.10 -0.14 0.11 0.22 0.09 0.48 1.00   
13. Road mileage 2.17 0.46 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.05 -0.46 -0.59 1.00  
14. Electricity price 0.62 0.14 0.02 0.25 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.12 -0.05 1.00 
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Table 3: Sub-national institutional constraints and foreign firm performance 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hypothesized variables      
Sub-national institutional index 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm size 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm size square -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.066*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Firm age  square -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.029*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Joint venture dummy -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) 
Export dummy 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Interactions      
Firm size *sub-national index  -0.006**    
  (0.003)    
Firm size square * sub-national index  0.001    
  (0.001)    
Firm age * sub-national index   -0.037***   
   (0.004)   
Firm age square * sub-national index   0.021***   
   (0.002)   
Joint venture dummy * sub-national index    0.017**  
    (0.008)  
Export dummy * sub-national index     -0.004** 
     (0.001) 
Control variables      
HMT firms 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales growth 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage ratio -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market concentration -0.048     -0.051 -0.050 -0.047 -0.052 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.037) (0.036) 
Electricity price -0.041* -0.041* -0.039 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) 
Road mileage 0.017* 0.017* 0.016* 0.015 0.017* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Average wage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Coastal dummy 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Home country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Wald chi-square 620.00 637.80 635.46 633.21 621.07 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix A: Sub-national institutional development index 
 
City  Index City  Index City  Index City  Index 
Jiangmen                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        2.02583 Sanming                                                                                                                                                          0.72219 Guangzhou                                                                         0.08141 Daqing                                                                                       -0.85162
Hangzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.97819 Weifang                                                                                                           0.71489 Leshan                                                                                                                                        0.07669 Anshan                                                                                                                                                   -0.8786
Shantou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1.70342 Deyang                                                                                                                          0.70791 
Qinhuangda
o                                                                           0.0433 Changde                                                                                                 -0.90149
Suzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.68334 Ganzhou                                                                                0.66559 Yuxi                                                                                         0.03039 Fushun                                                                                                                                                                        -0.90528
Huizhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1.65109 Foshan                                                                                                                                                              0.61514 Yichang                                                                                                                             0.00616 Huanggang                                                                -0.92729
Xiamen                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.52698 Jining                                                                                  0.54629 Yichun                                                                            -0.0062 Baoji                                                    -0.98958 
Shangqiu                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.42018 Mianyang                                                                                                                                                         0.54496 Hefei                                                     -0.0075 Kunming                                                                    -1.00099
Shenzhen                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.41596
Lianyungan
g                                                                    0.53007 Chongqing                                                                                         -0.0085 Xinxiang                                                                                             -1.04409 
Qingdao                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1.39566 Wenzhou                                                                                                                          0.52027 Wuzhong                                                                                           -0.0203 Wuhan                                                                                                                          -1.10195
Zhuhai                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.33373 Chuzhou                                                                                                                   0.49909 Baoding                                                            -0.08942 Xining                                                                                                                                                             -1.10225
Zhangzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       1.29981 Jingmen                                                                                                                     0.49228 Wulumuqi                                                              -0.113 Zhangjiakou                                                                                                                     -1.15223
Fuzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.29628 Yantai                                                                                                                                    0.48819 Yueyang                                                                                                                                                        -0.15462 Changsha                                                                           -1.15605
Dongguan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.27533 Dalian                                                         0.48414 Jinan                                                                     -0.25749 Qujing                                                                                         -1.2317 
Weihai                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.17608 Xiaogan                                                                                                     0.46081 Guilin                                                                  -0.27832 Benxi                                                                          -1.24299
Langfang                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.1427 Taian                                                                                                                                                                                        0.42878 Shijiazhuang                                                                                                                                                    -0.28984 Nanyang                                                                                                  -1.25851
Ningbo                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.11514 Zhengzhou                                                                                                         0.37395 Yibin                                                                                                  -0.37403 Qiqihaer                                                                                                         -1.30101
Maoming                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1.08933 Wuxi                                                                                                           0.35911 Changchun                                                                              -0.39423 Haikou                                                                   -1.31657
Shaoxing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.06679 Yancheng                                                                                                                                                        0.30927 Beijing                                                                                 -0.4133 Handan                                                                                                  -1.31778
Quanzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.05353 Anqing                                                                                        0.2897 Yinchuan                                                                                -0.41388 Zhuzhou                                                                                                                                               -1.36083
Jiaxing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1.04504 Cangzhou                                                                                                                                                               0.28606 Liuzhou                                                                                                    -0.53703 Ha'erbin                                                                                             -1.453
Nantong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         0.99859 Taizhou                                                                                                             0.28335 Shenyang                                                                                                                                  -0.56598 Taiyuan                                                   -1.53582
Linyi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           0.98413 Nanchang                                                                                                                                                             0.26156 Luoyang                                                                                                                                                         -0.57462 Nanning                                                                                                     -1.54896
Changzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       0.9445 Jingzhou                                                                                                    0.23011 Huhehaote                                                                                                                   -0.61125 Guiyang                                                                              -1.55069 
Huzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          0.85877 Chengdu                                                                                                                                                                          0.22458 Jilin                                                                  -0.65242 Hengyang                                                                            -1.67047
Yangzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        0.83314 Shanghai                                                                                       0.17443 Xiangfan                                                                                                                                                                     -0.6572 Datong                                                    -1.67301
Jinhua                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          0.81607 Zibo                                                                                     0.16969 Tianjin                                                                               -0.68376 Xi'an                                                                                      -1.71395 
Wuhu                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            0.78287 Chenzhou                                                       0.15593 Nanjing                                                                         -0.69121 Baotou                                                                                                                          -1.79662
Jinzhou                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         0.73465 Tangshan                                                                                                                       0.12293 Xuzhou                                                                     -0.73379 Lanzhou                                                                                                                                                    -1.9441
Xuchang                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         0.73345 Jiujiang                                                                                                                                            0.11669 Xianyang                                                                                           -0.73826 Zunyi                                                                                                                  -2.2601 
Note: The sub-national institutional index is calculated using the principal component analysis.  
